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NOTES AND COMMENTS
CURING AMERICAN MANAGERIAL MYOPIA: CAN THE GERMAN
SYSTEM OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE HELP?
I. INTRODUCTION
Between 1983 and 1992, shareholders' rights groups actively
lobbied the Tandy Corporation to dismiss its chairman and chief
executive officer, John V. Roach.1 During a period in which
computer and electronics companies were reporting record profits,
Tandy's sales and earnings growth were flat, causing the value of
its stock to decrease sixty-six percent.2 Relying on the support of
Tandy's board, however, the embattled CEO was able to resist
calls for his dismissal and focus on long-range plans to build a
national chain of technology retail stores.3 Based primarily on the
strength of sales at its new stores, Tandy's stock increased fifty
percent in 1994, its per-share net income grew by more than one
dollar, and sales were projected to reach fifteen billion dollars by
1999.
4
The events at Tandy illustrate many of the fundamental
problems caused by the separation of ownership from control in
American corporations. Having little or no access to corporate
"inside" information,5 shareholders are forced to focus on short-
term earnings reports and share prices in order to monitor the
performance of their investments. Corporate managers necessarily
pursue short-term growth strategies in order to appease their
shareholder constituencies, increasing significantly the equity cost
of capital-to-fund long-term research and development. Had
Tandy's shareholders known of Mr. Roach's plans to expand
1. Scott McCartney, Tandy, After Resisting Calls for CEO's Head, Enjoys a




5. Borrowing from analysis under Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994), and
Basic, Inc. v. Levenson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), for purposes of this Comment, inside
information is non-public information that a reasonable investor is substantially likely to
consider important in making an investment decision.
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Tandy's retail business, perhaps they would have been willing to
endure a temporary period of stagnant earnings growth. If the
CEO had disclosed the corporation's plans, however, he would
have risked the possibility that his competitors would obtain the
information, jeopardizing his company's planned expansion. Faced
with similar alternatives, chief executives of American companies
may be inclined to forego pursuit of their long-term plans and the
potential benefits that they may confer on the U.S. economy and
American workers.
6
When shareholders have a legitimate basis for their dissatisfac-
tion with management, however, they frequently have no recourse
other than to sell their stock. Agency costs of effectuating change
are so prohibitive to individual shareholders that they choose to
exercise their "Wall Street Option" rather than challenging
decisions of incumbent management.7 Thus, in the paradigmatic
American corporation, which does not possess any institutional
investors to monitor inefficient managers, management tends to
become entrenched and immune to change.8 While the board of
directors is intended to fulfill this monitoring role, it typically does
no more than ratify management's decisions.9 Indeed, Tandy's
John Roach could not have remained as CEO without the support
of Tandy's board, which is composed largely of his friends and col-
6. Traditionally, management's primary responsibility has been to maximize
shareholder value. A growing body of scholarly discourse, however, suggests that in
making decisions, corporate managers and directors must also consider nonshareholder
constituencies such as employees and the economy. Some theorists write that "[tlhe
ultimate goal of corporate governance is the creation of a healthy economy through the
development of business operations that operate for the long term and compete
successfully in the world economy." Martin Lipton & Stephen Rosenblum, A New System
of Corporate Governance: The Quiennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 187, 189
(1991). Some commentators label this theory the "stakeholder perspective" because it
requires managers to "seek to maximize long-term corporate health irrespective of effects
on short-term shareholder wealth." John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate
Cooperation, Relationship Management, and the Trialogical Imperative for Corporate Law,
78 MINN. L. REV. 1443, 1465 (1994).
7. According to the "Wall. Street Rule," investors who are dissatisfied with
management can voice their displeasure by selling their stock and reinvesting in a better-
managed company. See Corrine A. Franzen, Increasing the Competitiveness of U.S.
Corporations: Is Bank Monitoring the Answer?, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 271, 274 n.14
(1993).
8. For purposes of this Comment, institutional investors include private and public
pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds, and investment funds managed by
banks.
9. Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence,
39 UCLA L. REv. 895, 899 (1992).
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leagues.1" In Tandy's case, Mr. Roach was able to bring success
to the company by changing its direction. In similar situations,
however, many chief executives have severely damaged the
companies that they managed before shareholders were able to
oust them.1
Thus, the American system of corporate governance is
inherently flawed: it forces managers to pursue arbitrary short-
term objectives and possesses no viable mechanism by which
owners can hold management accountable for its decisions. The
ideal corporate governance system, in contrast, would "allow
management the discretion to act on the shareholders' behalf while
at the same time establishing safeguards against the abuse of
discretion."' 2  Recent scholarship has focused on the German
system of corporate governance, in which financial intermediaries
participate actively in management decisions, as a practical
manifestation of this ideal model.13
In the past decade, institutional investors have begun to bridge
the gap created by the separation of ownership from control in
American corporations. 4 Owning large illiquid blocks of stock,
10. McCartney, supra note 1, at Al.
11. American Express, IBM, and Kodak each lost positions of leadership in their
respective markets before their owners successfully effectuated changes in management.
For descriptions of events at these companies, see generally Dana Wechsler & Nancy
Rotenier, Good-bye to Berle & Means, FORBES, Jan. 1994.
A similar situation is currently ongoing at Kmart. Throughout the seven-year tenure
of CEO Joseph Antonini, the retailing concern consistently lost market share; most
recently, Kmart reported disappointing earnings for eight consecutive quarters. Until
recently, however, Mr. Antonini was able to rely on the support of Kmart's directors to
resist shareholder calls for his ouster. Joann S. Lublin & Christina Duff, How Do You
Fire a CEO? Very, Very Slowly, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 1994, at B1. See also Christina Duff
et al., Kmart's Embattled CEO Resigns Post Under Pressure From Key Shareholders, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 22, 1995, at A3.
12. Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REv. 863, 867 (1991).
13. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Controk The Institutional Investor as
Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1277 (1991); Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe,
Understanding the Japanese Keiretsw Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and
Industrial Organization, 102 YALE LJ. 871 (1993); Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in
Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1 (1993);
Franzen, supra note 7, at 271; Symposium, The American Corporation and the Institutional
Investor: Are There Lessons From Abroad?, 88 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 739 (1988).
14. This Comment adopts Jeffrey Gordon's definition of an institutional investor.
Professor Gordon defines institutional investors as "financial intermediaries which collect
and invest funds from diverse individuals and groups." Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as
Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 124, 130
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
for which there is a limited secondary market, has prompted these
investors to monitor their investments more diligently than
individual investors." Moreover, American regulatory bodies are
beginning to encourage the institutions that they oversee to
become more active shareholders. In particular, the Department
of Labor ("DOL") recently promulgated guidelines that encourage
corporate pension fund managers to vote the shares they own and
to monitor actively the companies in which they invest.1 6 Perhaps
institutional investors can become to American corporations what
financial intermediaries are to German corporations.
This Comment will examine the above-stated proposition. It
will ascertain whether the German system of corporate governance
or the DOL Guidelines are viable models on which to base
corporate reform in the United States. Part II compares corporate
governance systems in the United States and Germany, focusing
on the institutional relationships between shareholders and
managers in each system. Part III explores the increasing activism
of institutional investors in governing American corporations, and
the DOL's recent attempt to encourage this activism among
private pension funds. Finally, Part IV of this Comment asserts
that governance in U.S. corporations is moving toward the German
model. In discussing whether this trend is desirable, this Comment
will conclude that institutional investor activism, in its current
form, simply perpetuates the short-term myopia currently plaguing
American corporate managers.
II. A COMPARISON OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE
UNITED STATES, AND GERMANY: SHAREHOLDER MONITORING
OF MANAGEMENT
In its simplest form, a system of corporate governance
"establishe[s] the ground rules that dictate the relationships among
the owners, the boards of directors, and corporate manage-
ment. ',1 7 Variations in these relationships depend on differences
(1994).
15. See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
16. Interpretive Bulletins Relating to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,860, 38,862 (1994) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2509) [hereinafter
DOL Guidelines]. Because it administers ERISA, which regulates private pension funds,
the DOL directly oversees private pension fund activity.
17. MICHAEL T. JACOBS, SHORT-TERM AMERICA: THE CAUSES AND CURES OF OUR
BUSINESS MYOPIA 59 (1991). The Practising Law Institute defines corporate governance
618 [Vol. 17:615
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in the institutional frameworks and legal rules that define them.
Laws in the United States have established a market-based system
of control, which contrasts with the bank-based system in Germa-
ny.18 Yet, "it is now becoming clear that the main differences
between countries do not concern the way in which financial
systems fund their corporate sectors but the way in which
ownership and control is organized."1 9  While the German
corporate governance system unifies ownership and control, the
American system keeps them separate. This part of this Comment
identifies differences in the salient organizational features of
American corporations and their German counterparts in order to
understand why the German system simply would not work in the
United States.
A. Corporate Governance in the United States
1. The Separation of Ownership from Control
Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means first identified the
separation of ownership from control in American corporations as
a response to the needs of industrial companies in the early
twentieth century to raise massive amounts of capital to support
their rapid growth.2' In order to finance their growing operation-
al costs and expansion, American companies were forced to seek
capital from widely diverse investors, each of whom was financially
able to purchase only a small portion of a corporation's equity.
21
While such diversification initially decreased the cost of capital and
as follows:
The term 'corporate governance' refers to the legal and practical system for the
exercise of power and control in the conduct of the business of a corporation,
including in particular the relationships among the shareholders, the board of
directors and its committees, the executive officers, and other constituencies (such
as employees, local communities, and major customers and suppliers).
Warren F. Grienberger, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance, in
PREPARATION OF ANNUAL DISCLOSURE DOcuMENTs 1994, at 1 (PLI Corp. Law and
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 834, 1994) (emphasis in original).
18. Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Corporate Control: A Synthesis of the International
Evidence 1 (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
International & Comparative Law Journal).
19. Id
20. ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION &
PRIVATE PROPERTY 4-7 (1932). Thereafter, the prototypical American public company
became known as a Berle-Means corporation.
21. See Roe, supra note 13, at 7.
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promoted efficiency, ultimately it has created a class of passive
investors who lack the ability, information, and incentives to
monitor actively their corporations.22 This passive investment
phenomenon has allowed American managers to make fundamen-
tal decisions without the input of their corporation's true own-
ers.' Moreover, shareholders who indeed choose to become
active in management bear all the costs of monitoring corporations
but share the gains in value equally with the corporations' other
shareholders.24 This potential for free-riding by uninvolved
shareholders provides a strong disincentive for those who wish to
become active. Thus, most shareholders of American companies
typically spread their risk across diversified holdings, which they
hold for investment purposes, rather than purchasing concentrated
blocks for control purposes.2"
With the enactment of laws that limited large financial
institutions' ability to hold concentrated blocks of stock, the
separation of ownership from control became firmly integrated
into the structure of authority in American corporations. 6 In the
Glass-Steagal Act, Congress separated commercial banks from
22. Franks & Mayer, supra note 18, at 4. Monitoring does not necessarily mean close
supervision of management's daily decisions. Rather, this Comment adopts Robert A.G.
Monk's definition:
What I mean by governance is oversight in those areas where managers,
directors, and shareholders have conflicts of interest, including the election of
directors, very general supervision of ... [executive compensation], and the
overall structure and direction of the company. Shareholders are not there to
appoint the CEO or second-guess his decisions. They are there to make sure that
the directors perform those functions effectively and in their interests, and to
replace them if they fail.
Robert A.G. Monks, Relationship Investing 10 (1993) (unpublished paper presented at the
Conference of Relational Investing of the Institutional Investor Project Center for Law
and Economic studies at the Columbia University School of Law) (on file with the Loyola
of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Journal).
23. Gilson & Roe, supra note 13, at 876. See also Franzen, supra note 7, at 274.
24. Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 10, 12 (1991).
25. Franks & Mayer, supra note 18, at 4.
26. Part I of this Comment presents only a survey of applicable laws to illustrate
generally that legal rules have created regulatory impediments to institutions' participating
in the control of American public firms. In general, these laws have prevented large
financial institutions from owning the concentrated blocks of stock that they would require
in order to monitor effectively the corporations in which they invest. See generally John
C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 837 (1994).
For more detailed discussions of these laws, see Franzen, supra note 7, at 274-79; Roe,
supra note 24, at 17-31; and Bill Shaw & John Rowlett, Reforming the U.S. Banking
System: Lessons from Abroad, 19 N.C. J. INT'L. & COMM. REG. 91, 97-106 (1993).
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investment banks, preventing the former from owning and dealing
in securities. 27  Several years later, Congress enacted the Bank
Holding Company Act, which permits banks to conduct only
"banking" activities and prohibits bank affiliates from holding
more than five percent of a company's stock, unless the shares are
nonvoting.28
Several U.S. laws also prevent mutual funds, pension funds,
and insurance companies from controlling companies through stock
ownership. If mutual funds hold greater than a ten percent stake
in any one of the companies in their portfolios, they forfeit their
diversified status and, therefore, lose preferential tax treatment.29
In various states, regulations prevent insurance companies from
owning controlling blocks of stocks.30 Finally, the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") ensures that pension
funds remain highly diversified.31
Moreover, Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
proxy regulations limit the American shareholders' ability to
communicate with each other, thus making it difficult for them to
exert control through concerted action. Historically, shareholders
could not engage in communication that called for any action
which was part of a continuous plan; when ten shareholders
communicated with each other, without first filing proxy material,
27. Glass-Steagal Act, 48 Stat. 184 (1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 24
(Supp. II 1990). In response to the bank failures and the stock market collapse, which led
to the Great Depression, Congress passed this Act to protect depositors funds and limit
conflicts of interest. Franzen, supra note 7, at 274.
28. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6)-(7) (1988).
29. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b) (1988). Subchapter M of
the Internal Revenue Code levies substantial tax penalties on mutual funds which are not
diversified. I.R.C. § 851(b)(4) (1988).
30. See Roe, supra note 24, at 23. New York, California, Illinois, and Texas all closely
regulate insurance companies' stock ownership. Id.
31. Pub. L. No. 93-406,88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 10041-11461,
and in scattered sections of titles 5, 18, 26, 31, and 42 U.S.C.). In 1974, Congress enacted
ERISA to regulate private pension funds. One of Congress' primary goals in promulgating
ERISA was to ensure that pension funds diversified their investments. Professor Roe
writes:
Congress enacted ERISA ... which, with no discernable governance-related
motive, confirmed the preexisting structure of corporate governance, by
encouraging pensions to adopt the fragmented, passive stockholding structure
that the three other big financial institutions-banks, insurers, and mutual
funds-usually adopt.
Mark J. Roe, The Modem Corporation and Private Pensions, 41 UCLA L. REv. 75, 76
(1993).
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they presumptively violated SEC rules.32  The tremendous
transaction costs associated with filing proposals for consideration
by proxy effectively chilled shareholders from attempting to
initiate such campaigns."
In 1992, the SEC amended its proxy regulations to allow stock
owners broader latitude to communicate with each other.' The
SEC amendments were intended to provide shareholders with a
stronger voice in their corporations' affairs. 35  While the proxy
reforms have reduced the cost of shareholder communications,
their overall impact on corporate governance in the United States
is questionable.36  Furthermore, although facilitating greater
communication between shareholders is important, it is insufficient
to improve shareholder monitoring. In order to become better
monitors of management, shareholders need to communicate more
with corporate managers than with each other.
The most important consequence of shareholders' inability to
assert control is that managers are essentially free to pursue their
own agendas unchecked by other corporate constituencies. In
other words, the separation of ownership from control creates
agency costs because managers of public firms pursue agendas that
do not reflect the interests of their companies' owners.37 Further-
more, managers frequently tend to place their own interests before
those of shareholders. 3 Thus, the challenge of the American
system of governance is to align shareholders' and managers'
32. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(1) (1990). See also Studebaker v. Gitlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d
Cir. 1966).
33. Winning a proxy contest not only involves hiring attorneys to prepare mailings to
be sent to other shareholders, but also commonly entails purchasing advertising space in
major financial newspapers and hiring a solicitation firm. Given many shareholders' lack
of interest in voting their shares, the chance of securing a majority of votes is stacked
against anyone who challenges management's nominee. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 80.
34. See generally Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act
Release No. 31,326 [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '1 85,051 (Oct. 16,
1992).
35. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1470. It is beyond the purview of this
Comment to present a detailed discussion of the SEC proxy reforms. For in-depth
analyses of the SEC reforms, see id. at 1469-75; Coffee, supra note 26, at 840 n.17; Justin
P. Klein & Gerald J. Guarcini, The New Proxy Solicitation Rules, 26 REV. OF SEC. &
COMMODITIES REG. 89 (1993); Robert S. Frenchman, Comment, The Recent Revisions to
Federal Proxy Regulations: Lifting the Ban on Shareholder Communications, 68 TUL. L.
REV. 161 (1993).
36. Coffee, supra note 26, at 840-42; Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1447.
37. Monks, supra note 22, at 3.
38. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 24, at 12.
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agendas. When the inevitable conflicts arise between shareholders'
objectives and managers' agendas, the system must provide a
forum for discussion in which similarly informed, motivated, and
empowered participants can agree on resolutions that comport
with their objectives.
39
2. The Board of Directors Internal Monitoring Role
Because it is both impractical and costly for numerous, widely
dispersed shareholders to participate equally in this process,
however, the American system has developed internal and external
mechanisms to facilitate shareholder monitoring. Within the
corporation, a board of directors represents shareholders' interests
before management. Ideally, shareholders dictate how the
company is run by establishing its charter and bylaws, and entrust
to the board the responsibility to see that management effectuates
their mandate.4°  By electing outside directors who are not
affiliated with the corporation, shareholders can theoretically rely
on an impartial party to champion their interests.41
In practice, however, shareholders are not well-protected.
Management selects candidates for the board-typically similarly
situated chief executives of other companies-and determines their
tenure.42 In general, these directors will not monitor any more
diligently than they feel they should be monitored in running their
own companies and will rarely risk loosing their jobs by question-
ing management's decisions.4 3 Thus, directors frequently fail to
represent shareholders' interests because they become beholden to
the managers they are supposed to oversee.
In theory, shareholders may rely on the courts to ensure that
directors fulfill their mandate;" however, judges abstain from
39. Monks, supra note 22, at 3.
40. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 72.
41. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 12, at 873 (1991). The rationale for relying on
outside directors is simple: because they "do not have a personal financial stake in
retaining management, they can act as shareholder surrogates to assure that the company
is run in the long-term best interests of its owners." Id.
42. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 72. Sixty-three percent of the outside directors of public
companies are CEOs of other public companies. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 12, at
875.
43. Id.
44. Courts ensure that directors fulfill their legal responsibilities to shareholders.
These legal responsibilities include the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. The duty of
loyalty prevents directors from serving their own interests at a corporations' expense.
1995] 623
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second-guessing business decisions that are made in good faith,
even if the decision has proven harmful to the corporation.45  A
shareholder who brings a claim against a director must meet the
substantial, even overwhelming burden of proving that a director's
decision was uninformed and the product of fraud, illegality, or
bad faith.46 Moreover, some jurisdictions now allow corporations
to opt out of the informed decision-making standard, and all
jurisdictions, in varying degrees, indemnify directors for liabilities
incurred while performing work duties.47 The net result is that
shareholders cannot effectively use judicial action to hold directors
accountable for their decisions.
3. . The Market for Corporate Control as External Monitor
Perhaps the most effective monitor of American managerial
performance, and the primary external source of pressure on
management, is the market for corporate control. Market theorists
posit that stock prices reflect all available information on a
corporation and, thus, are a reliable indicator of managerial
efficiency.4 An inefficient corporation, whose share price does
not reflect accurately the actual or potential value of its assets, is
susceptible to a hostile takeover, leading to a likely ouster of
management.49 Conversely, companies that appear to maximize
Maricano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400 (Del. 1987). "It is a long-established principle of
Delaware corporate law that the fiduciary relationship between directors and the
corporation imposes fundamental limitations on the extent to which a director may benefit
from dealings with the corporation he serves." Id. at 403.
The duty of care ensures that directors are competent, diligent and exercise good faith
in their decision-making and supervisory functions. See generally Litwin v. Allen, 25
N.Y.S.2d 667 (1940). See also JACOBS, supra note 17, at 77.
45. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (1985).
46. See id. (holding directors liable for not being adequately informed when they
approved a negotiated merger). The "business judgment" rule presumes that:
[iln making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was
in the best interests of the company. Thus, the party attacking a board decision
as uninformed must rebut the presumption that its business judgment was an
informed one.
Id. at 860.
47. John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Law and the Longterm
Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1313, 1346 (1992). For
example, Delaware has both Van Gorkom opt-out and director indemnification provisions.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(b)(7), 145(c) (1991).
48. For a discussion of the efficient market hypothesis, see generally Ronald J. Gilson
& Reiner H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).
49. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 47, at 1336.
624
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a shareholder's return on investment attract capital and, therefore,
are able to resist unwanted overtures of corporate raiders.50 The
market for corporate control champions the role of the corporate
raider who assists shareholders in identifying low corporate
valuations that arise from inefficient management." Such
corporate raiders theoretically enable normally powerless share-
holders to remove poor management by choosing to tender into a
hostile bid.5
The focus on short-term maximization of shareholder wealth
is misguided and potentially detrimental to the American economy.
Because the primary indicator of inefficient management is share
price, managers attempt to fend off the takeover threat by keeping
share prices high in the short-term, at the expense of long-term
growth.13 Management tends to react to market signals by reduc-
ing budgetary outlays for investment, advertising, research, and
development in order to ensure that quarterly earnings remain
high." Such myopia prevents companies from positioning them-
selves for long-term growth and, thus, adversely affects the
competitiveness of the American economy as a whole. Further-
more, management may blame poor performance on short-term
pressures when, in fact, management itself may be the primary
source of the corporation's problems.5 Indeed, ousting ineffi-
cient management frequently could save the parties to a hostile
takeover from incurring substantial transaction costs and prevent
local economies from losing jobs as well as revenue.
The market-as-monitor theory presupposes that an active
takeover market indicates widespread managerial inefficiency;
however, this a questionable assumption. Takeovers are strategic
instruments that are more a function of a healthy corporate
economy than a mechanism of corporate control.56 They occur
when acquiring companies have enough capital and operational
50. Id
51. Franks & Mayer, supra note 18, at 5.
52. Franzen, supra note 7, at 291. Shareholders, however, rarely have such benevolent
motivations. They choose to tender into a hostile bid only if it will maximize their
investment.
53. Id.
54. Jonathan Charkham, Hands Across the Sea, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 765, 768 (1988).
55. Id.
56. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1454 n.49.
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profit to support aggressive growth. 7 For instance, in the 1980s,
when the American economy was robust, the takeover market
flourished. 8 Following the 1987 market crash, the savings and
loan crisis, and the resulting American recession, however,
takeover activity all but disappeared. 9 Once the American
economy emerged from recession and entered a period of
impressive growth in 1993, tender offers resurfaced, particularly in
the industries in which growth has exceeded that of the economy
as a whole.6° Because tender offers are a cyclical phenomenon,
occurring only when acquiring companies can afford to finance
growth primarily through acquisition, shareholders cannot rely on
takeovers to exert discipline over managers.
When they have sufficient capital, acquiring companies are
motivated more by strategic and competitive concerns than by a
desire to oust inefficient management. 61  Hostile bids frequently
occur despite good past performance, often in anticipation that the
acquiring company will implement a superior policy in the fu-
ture.6' The executive dismissals and restructuring that inevitably
occur after most takeovers are more a reflection of disputes
between new and incumbent management over strategy and style
than a need to replace inefficient management.63 For example,
in its recent acquisition of Paramount, Viacom was not motivated
by the need to replace Martin Davis and increase share value.'
Rather, Paramount was the only remaining unaffiliated major
57. For a discussion of the causes of takeover activity, see generally Roberta Romano,
A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119 (1992).
58. Michael Quint, Wall Street; M & A Redux With a Difference, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19,
1993, at C3.
59. Recycling a Favorite From Headier Times: A Recovery in Demand for Public
Targets Sparked a Revival of the Tender Offer, MERGERS & ACQUISmONS, June 1994, at
27. "Tenders took a back seat from 1990 to 1992 as mergers and acquisitions activity
crumbled under a mix of pressure ranging from the sour economy to tight financing to a
general pullback from deal-making from companies that had loaded up on acquisitions
during the 1980's." Id. See also Mergers, Acquisition Activity Fell 18% in 1st Quarter,
Hitting an 11-Year Low, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 1991, at A2; Mergers at an 11-Year Low,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1991, at D10.
60. See Quint, supra note 58, at C3.
61. Franks & Mayer, supra note 18, at 7.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. In fact, Mr. Davis orginally intended to remain as an employee of the new merged
entity; however, he has since changed his mind. See Jonathan Weber, Entertainment Mega




motion picture studio with which Viacom effectively could combine
its cable systems.65 In 1989, Paramount unsuccessfully attempted
to block a planned merger between Time, Inc. and Warner
Communications solely because it wanted to prevent Time from
gaining a competitive advantage.' Acquiring companies' actions
are inherently self-interested and, therefore, are not motivated by
the more benevolent desire to correct managerial failure and give
shareholders more bang for their buck.
Thus, the American system of corporate governance lacks a
viable mechanism to minimize agency costs caused by the separa-
tion of ownership from control. Directors are beholden to
management and insulated from shareholders. The market serves
as a forum for the formation of synergistic partnerships and not as
a monitor of management. Share price and quarterly earnings are
inadequate barometers of managerial performance because they
fail to reflect accurately the long-term value of a corporation and
force executives into a state of perpetual myopia. To evaluate the
merits of a system that gives shareholders greater access to inside
information and more of a vested interest in managing the
companies they own, one must look no further than the German
system of corporate governance.
B. Corporate Governance in Germany
Unlike American corporations, German public companies rely
on banks and not the market as their primary source of external
finance.67 Without the analogue of a Glass-Steagal Act to
segregate their activities, German banks participate actively in
governing German corporations as creditors, substantial holders of
equity, and on behalf of customers who deposit their shares with
banks' brokerage units.' As a result of banks' extensive role in
65. Amy Harmon, Viacom's Strategy-Merging the Content with Distribution
Technology: An Acquisition of Paramount Would Put the New Giant in Enviable Position
with Vertical Integration, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1994, at All.
66. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
67. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 69. Thus, most German corporations are not public
companies. In 1992, of 380,000 total German corporations, only 700 were listed on a
public stock exchange. Id.
68. Theodor Baums, Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of the Banks, 40
AM. J. CoMP. L. 503, 506 (1992). Consequently, German banks are multi-dimensional:
Most of the 4500 [German] banks are universal banks, which may be active in the
classical banking business as well as in the securities and (through subsidiaries)
in the investment banking business; trade with real estate; organize rescue
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German corporations, German shareholders and managers share
a vastly different relationship than their American brethren, and
in contrast to the prototypical American Berle-Means corporation,
ownership and control are largely synonymous.
1. Concentration of Share Ownership
Because banks control ownership of German corporations,
German shareholdings are significantly more concentrated than
American shareholdings.6 ' German CEOs typically can expect to
face two or three large institutional blocks, which together control
thirty percent of their firm's voting shares.70 In contrast, it is rare
for an American CEO to face an institutional block that controls
even five percent of the vote.71 Such concentration of ownership
accounts for an illiquid German stock market, limits individual
investors' role in German corporations, and minimizes the threat
that German corporations will be taken over by unwanted buyers.
Dense concentration of shareholdings and German
corporations' reliance on banks, and not the market, for external
financing has left the German Exchange weak and ineffective as
a vehicle for German companies to raise capital.72 Of the
relatively small number of firms that are listed on the German
exchange, only a few raise capital by issuing exchange-listed
securities.73  Bank syndicates, which control issuance of new
securities, charge high fees for underwriting stock offerings and
ensure that prices for first time issues are low.74 Thus, only
widely-held companies can afford to raise capital by issuing
securities to the public.
75
operations for firms in financial distress; be active in the M&A sector; own stock
in industrial firms; and administer their clients property and vote their clients
shares.
lit
69. Roe, supra note 13, at 10. In Germany, a small group of institutional investors
usually votes 20% of a company's stock, while the largest five holders of an American
company's equity together commonly control less than five percent of all shares, even with
the recent "institutionalization and concentration" of American holdings. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id
72. Hermann H. Kallfass, The German Experience, 88 COLUM L. REv. 775 (1988).
73. Coffee, supra note 13, at 1302. In 1986, there were only 450 listed companies in
Germany, in comparison with 6000 in the United States. Franks & Mayer, supra note 18,
at 3.




Additionally, substantial bank involvement limits individual
investors' role in German corporations.7 6  The few individuals
who do own stock willingly permit banks to administer their
shares, adding to banks' influence." Moreover, German compa-
nies use the stock market not to disseminate their securities to the
public but rather "to build up lasting corporate interdependen-
cies."7 Therefore, the German market is largely illiquid, because
it lacks an active secondary market in which investors readily trade
their holdings. 9
Consequently, the German corporate governance system relies
exclusively on internal institutional precautions, and not on a
takeover market, as a means of exerting control over manage-
ment.80  The concentrated structure of German shareholdings
effectively minimizes the takeover threat, and voting rights restric-
tions allow shareholders to impede attempts by acquirors to gain
controlling interests in firms.81 Furthermore, because the German
market is relatively illiquid, individual shareholders rarely have the
opportunity to tender into a hostile bid.82 Unlike American
shareholders, German owners cannot readily sell their stocks if
they are displeased with management. Therefore, German
shareholders are compelled to "exercise voice" over the way in
which the firms they own manage their affairs.83
Finally, concentration of ownership allows German sharehold-
ers to communicate easily with each other without facing the
significant transaction costs that diffuse American shareholders
76. Franzen, supra note 7, at 284. "Corporate management in Germany is monitored
by institutional investors (predominantly banks, insurance companies and investment
funds), which are the main holders of shares in Germany." Id
77. Baums, supra note 68, at 506.
78. Kallfass, supra note 72, at 786.
79. Franks & Mayer, supra note 18, at 3. For a more detailed discussion of the
mechanics of the German Stock Exchange, see generally Kailfass, supra note 72.
80. Baums, supra note 68, at 505. As of 1992, there had been only four hostile
takeovers in Germany since World War II, and, of those, three occurred after 1989.
Franks & Mayer, supra note 18, at 8.
81. Franks & Mayer, supra note 18, at 9. Shareholders frequently pass resolutions that
limit the voting right of any one shareholder to no more than 15% of total voting shares,
regardless of the size of the shareholder's stake. These are not absolute defenses to
takeovers, however. Rather, they lead to a slower, two-stage process in which prospective
bidders first attempt to have the restrictions removed and then proceed with the usual
tender offer process. Id The voting restrictions do not apply when banks vote as
custodians on behalf of their clients. Baums, supra note 68, at 507, 508.
82. See, e.g., Franks & Mayer, supra note 18, at 8.
83. Coffee, supra note 13, at 1304.
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face when they attempt to communicate. Furthermore, German
laws do not block collective action by German shareholders in the
way that SEC proxy regulations block collective action by
American shareholders.' Thus, when German shareholders
disagree with management they can act in unison to achieve their
objectives.
2. The German Proxy System
Yet, German banks do not derive their ability to influence
corporate management solely from direct ownership of substantial
equity stakes in German corporations. Rather, they gain their
influence from voting both directly owned stock and shares held
as custodians for their clients.85 In fact, banks typically vote in
favor of management's proposals.86 If the need arises, however,
banks can act unilaterally to defeat management proposals that
they oppose.8s
German banks' considerable voting power allows them to
place representatives on German supervisory boards, and therein
lies one of the most important differences between German and
American systems of corporate governance.'m German superviso-
ry board members are commonly employed by shareholders of the
84. Baums, supra note 68, at 505. "There is no [German] proxy system comparable to
the American practice." Id.
85. Id Professor Baums details German banks' voting power in the following study
conducted in 1984:
All banks together on average represented more than four-fifths (82.67%) of all
votes which were present in [company] meetings. With one exception, they
always had at least a majority (more than 50%) of the votes present. Conse-
quently, they were able to elect the members of the supervisory boards (so far
as these are elected by the shareholders, not the employees). Changes of the
articles and bylaws of the corporation could not be effected against their votes.
In 22, or two-thirds of the firms the banks voted more than three-fourths of the
stock present, and thereby could change the articles and by-laws. No other
shareholder could block these decisions.
Id at 507.
86. Franzen, supra note 7, at 286.
87. See Roe, supra note 13, at 14. "Although no single bank generally controls an
industrial firm, ... together the three German large banks can, if they act in unison,
dominate the shareholding side of the supervisory board." Id
88. Baums, supra note 68, at 505. In public firms with more than 2000 employees,
German shareholders appoint half of the supervisory board members, and employees or
labor unions appoint the other half. Id. at 510. For a definition of "supervisory board"
and a discussion of their role in German corporations, see infra notes 91-101 and
accompanying text.
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companies on whose boards they serve.89 Because they are
selected by shareholders and not managers, they are able to
remain more impartial than American board members when
evaluating management decisions.
Consequently, it is difficult for German corporate managers
to pursue damaging strategies for extended periods without facing
outside intervention from shareholders.' Bank control of share-
holder voting prevents German managers from dominating the
proxy process, as American managers do.91 Most importantly,
limiting corporate managers' roles in the voting process effectively
guarantees German shareholders a significant representative voice
in German public firms' affairs.
3. The German Codetermination System
In order to monitor management internally, German public
firms use a codetermination system in which supervisory boards
appoint, dismiss, and oversee management boards, which, in turn,
execute corporations' daily affairs.' Supervisory boards regularly
advise management on major decisions but actually intervene in
management only in crisis situations.9' Thus, they influence
German corporate managers but do not control their decisions.9
The most important function of the dual board system,
however, is that it allows owners to interact regularly with
management and to review informally management's performance
two to four times a year.95 To facilitate meaningful interaction,
German supervisory boards have access to comprehensive
89. Members of the managing or supervisory boards of banks frequently also serve on
the supervisory boards of firms in which they hold substantial equity positions. For
example, executives of Deutsche Bank serve on more than 400 corporate boards. Id.
90. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 71.
91. Roe, supra note 13, at 18. "It is doubtful that [German managers] can even
lawfully make a proxy solicitation. Instead, German managers must filter proxy
solicitations through bankers, who vote their own stock, their mutual funds' stock, and
their customers' custodial stock." Id
92. Baums, supra note 68, at 504.
93. Franks & Mayer, supra note 18, at 11. Supervisory boards "evaluate plans put
forward by management and monitor their implementation but in the normal course of
events they intervene little in the activities of management." Id. at 11-12.
94. Roe, supra note 13, at 19. "[T]he supervisory board provides shareholders with
influence, although not control, in corporate governance. Managers still have the upper
hand, but the tilt is not nearly as pro-managerial as is has historically been in the United
States." Id.
95. Id. at 18.
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corporate information.96 In addition to receiving periodic reports
from management, supervisory boards review annual reports and
balance sheets.' They possess the authority to compel reports on
demand and to require management to obtain their approval
before entering into certain transactions.9 Thus, board member-
ship provides creditors and major shareholders of German
corporations with regular access to corporations' long-range plans
and managing boards' current weaknesses.
Dialogue between German managers and supervisory board
members occurs in a private forum, away from those who are
likely to misappropriate it.9 Supervisory board members must
treat the information they receive from management confidential-
ly.10 Thus, German managers are able to share information with
shareholders without risking that it will fall into the hands of
competitors or that it will be disseminated to the public. °1
American managers do not share this luxury, because there is
currently no private forum in which they can disclose confidential
information to shareholders. Indeed, sharing such information
with shareholders could potentially subject them to liability under
SEC insider trading regulations."0 2
Systematic structured interaction between managers and
owners enables German executives to align their agendas with
96. Baums, supra note 68, at 510.
97. Id.
98. For example, a firm's supervisory board may condition extension of credit above
a certain level on receipt of its prior approval. Id.
99. Id. at 513. "(I]nformation about the plans and the quality of the firm's
management can be disclosed to its main creditor(s) without the need to make the
information public." Id.
100. Id. at 510.
101. Until 1994, German shareholders could even trade their shares based on the non-
public information they received from management because insider trading was not an
enforceable crime under German law; however, German legislators recently enacted a new
law that criminalizes insider trading, thus eliminating this possibility. See generally Petra
Mennicke, Insider Regulation in Germany: the Change from Self-Regulation to Criminal
Law, 15 Co. LAW. 155 (1994).
102. SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1994). A shareholder in possession of inside
information can only trade when there has been wide dissemination of that information
on the market. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Cc.., 401 F.2d 833 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969). There is currently no confidential forum in which American managers can
share inside information with shareholders. Thus, even if managers provide information
only to select shareholders, they risk that it will end up either in the hands of a competitor




those of shareholders. Shareholders, in turn, are able to minimize
their investment risk and refrain from pressuring managers to meet
arbitrary short-term objectives. Establishing in American corpora-
tions a similar institutional forum for sharing of information would
similarly minimize agency costs and improve the long-range
competitiveness of American corporations.
C. Summary
While American corporations are subject to "a continuous
auction in which control can at any time be transferred to the
highest bidder," German corporations rely on committees to
monitor management. 3 Because American shareholders are
widely dispersed, they are unable to communicate without
incurring substantial transaction costs and, therefore, monitoring
managers costs a great deal more than selling their stock.
Moreover, there is no guarantee that monitoring will produce
favorable results. The structural elements of the committee
system, in contrast, provide German shareholders with strong
incentives to monitor management that are lacking in American
corporations. Concentrated blocks of stock, structured interac-
tion, and voting control allow German shareholders to monitor
managers without facing significant costs."t4  Additionally,
because German shareholders cannot easily sell their stock, they
are compelled to monitor managers to protect the value of their
investments.
German banks, in particular, benefit from interacting with
corporate management. As shareholders with voting control,
banks are able to protect their equity investment without making
capital infusions.'05 As creditors with access to corporate inside
information, banks can minimize their investment risk and ensure
that debtors are able to meet long-term debt obligations.'°6
103. Franks & Mayer, supra note 18, at 12.
104. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 13, at 27.
105. Baums, supra note 68, at 516.
[I]f a bank holds an equity position of 12% of a firm's stock and commands
another 15% through its client's deposited shares, it has a blocking minority
against the issuance of new stock and against the elimination of [its] preemptive
rights that it would not have as a 12% owner alone.
Id.
106. Id at 517.
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Therefore, it is highly cost-effective for German banks to protect
their investments by monitoring management closely.
Thus, bank monitoring and the codetermination system
minimize agency costs in German corporations. Such monitoring
is effectuated entirely within the structural organs of the corpora-
tion; external market forces rarely influence managerial behavior.
In contrast, American corporations are monitored almost exclu-
sively by the market for corporate control; internal monitoring
mechanisms typically fail to provide an adequate check on
managers. Neither system of corporate governance provides a
healthy balance. Reliance on internal monitoring mechanisms
alone leads to a weak, illiquid stock market. Reliance exclusively
on the market for corporate control compels shortsightedness and
disfavors long-term growth. In order to permit managers greater
freedom to institute growth-oriented policies, yet aligned with
shareholders' objectives, the American system must develop a
viable internal monitoring mechanism.
III. PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS AS INTERNAL MONITORS
As owners of more than fifty percent of all U.S. equities,
institutional investors appear to be the natural choice to fill this
internal void." 7  Of the financial institutions that are legally
eligible to own equities, insurance companies, private pension
funds, investment companies, and public pension funds own the
most stock respectively and, therefore, have the greatest potential
to influence corporate management." Legal impediments,
however, prevent insurance companies and investment holding
107. "[I]n 1975, institutions owned 30% of U.S. equities, but by 1992, they owned
slightly more than 50%." Market 2000 Report: Study II, Structure of the U.S. Equity
Markets, Jan. 1994, available in LEXIS, FEDSEC Library, SECREL File [hereinafter
Market 2000 Report]. But see Coffee, supra note 26, at 843. Professor Coffee writes:
That institutional investors are large does not necessarily imply that they will be
aggressive monitors. To the contrary, institutional investors (and, more
importantly, those who manage them) may have only weak incentives to engage
in managerial monitoring of their portfolio companies and thus will form effective
shareholder coalitions only under limited circumstances.
Id.
108. The aggregate holdings of institutional investors in 1991 were broken down in the
following manner: insurance companies owned 29.7%; private pensions, 26.6%; investment
companies, 17.2%; bank trusts, 12.0%; public pensions, 11.6%; and foundations and
endowments, 2.9%. Mark R. Wingerson & Christopher H. Dom, Institutional Investors
in the U.S. and the Repeal of Poison Pills: A Practitioner's Perspective, 92 COLUM. BUS. L.
REv. 223, 226 (1992).
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companies from assuming an active monitoring role."° Thus, the
burden of watching management has fallen largely on the shoul-
ders of public and private pension funds"' Although public
pension funds have garnered the public spotlight with their
frequent criticism of corporate management, they do not own
sufficient stock to exert appreciable influence over managers'
decisions."' While private corporate pensions do hold enough
equity to have an impact on management, they have been reluctant
to do so.' Part III. A. of this Comment identifies reasons why
private pension funds have practiced passive investment strategies
and discusses the DOL's recent attempt to compel them to assume
an active monitoring role.
A. Causes of Private Pension Fund Passivity
In theory, owning concentrated shareholdings should provide
institutional investors with greater incentives and ability to engage
in monitoring activity. For displeased individual investors,
disposing of their holdings on the open market costs significantly
less than attempting to influence management."3 Institutional
investors, in contrast, are effectively unable to liquidate their
holdings on the secondary market. Selling such large blocks of
stock on the open market depresses share price and prevents
holders from realizing the stock's true value."4 Thus, institution-
al investors should be compelled to participate in corporate gover-
nance in order to preserve the long-term value of their invest-
ments. Moreover, with concentrated voting power and the ability
109. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
110. Roe, supra note 13, at 46. In response to the legal suppression of banks and
insurance companies, mutual funds and pensions have emerged in this decade as
substitutes. Id. Thus, pension funds own much more stock than any other institution. In
1990, public and private pension funds together were "three times as large as their nearest
competitor." Coffee, supra note 26, at 848.
111. Coffee, supra note 26, at 849. One of the largest and most active public pensions
is the California Public Employees Retirement System. See generally Steve Hemmerick,
CALPERS Continuing Shareholder Activism, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, May 30, 1994.
For a discussion of public pension fund activism, see generally Roberta Romano, Public
Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM L. REV. 795
(1993).
112. In 1993, private pension funds owned 22% of all corporate equity. Coffee, supra
note 26, at 849.
113. Coffee, supra note 13, at 1288.
114. Wingerson & Dorn, supra note 108, at 227.
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to act collectively with other institutions, it may be less costly for
institutions to intervene in management than to sell their shares.
Most institutional investors, however, and private pension
funds in particular, have chosen to pursue short-term passive
investment strategies.115 The decision to remain passive is often
made by external fund managers hired by corporations to manage
their pension funds.116 These managers frequently possess com-
plete authority both to invest corporations' pension funds and to
vote the shares of the companies in their portfolios. 7 Having
such considerable power allows them to decide unilaterally on
investment strategies for the portfolios they manage.'
Fund managers' reasons for adopting passive investment
strategies are numerous. Above all, fund managers are not
concerned with daily management of their portfolio companies.
Rather, their primary objective is to maximize the value of their
clients' investments." 9 They decide to act only if the expected
benefits of doing so outweigh the costs of engaging in a particular
course of action.120
115. Franzen, supra note 7, at 294. From 1975 until the beginning of 1992, the amount
of U.S. equity assets passively managed increased from under $1 billion to $231 billion.
Market 2000 Report, supra note 107, at 8.
116. Coffee, supra note 26, at 860. Most corporate pension funds hire outside money
managers to administer their funds and allow the money managers to decide if they want
to engage in activism in order to boost their returns. Id at 861. Not surprisingly, a recent
report indicated that only 27% of the 1077 corporate sponsors surveyed managed some
of their pension fund money internally. Vineeta Anand, Corporate Funds Still Not Active
Investors: DOL Bulletin Expected to Have No Impact, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, July 25,
1994, at 35.
117. Coffee, supra note 26, at 860.
118. The power these pension fund managers possess cannot be overstated.
Accordingly, Professor Roe writes: "to a large extent, the managerial command structure
of private pensions determines American corporate governance." Roe, supra note 31, at
113.
119. Robert C. Pozen, Institutional Investors: The Reluctant Activists, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 140.
120. Id. at 141. Robert Pozen details the cost-benefit analysis that a fund manager
performs in deciding whether to take action:
The costs of activism depend primarily on the tools with which an institution
exerts influence; from the high cost of waging a formal proxy fight to the low cost
of holding informal discussions with management. The benefits depend partly on
the probability of success and partly on the issue at hand, with more potential
benefit from proposals directly affecting stock price and less from proposals for
procedural reforms.
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Yet, it is impractical for pension fund managers to perform cost-
benefit analyses for all of the companies in their portfo-
lios. 121 Because the funds they manage are so widely diversified,
fund managers simply lack the resources necessary to evaluate
carefully the management of the companies in whom they
invest.'22 Thus, in order to minimize their risk of loss, reduce
transaction costs, and efficiently manage large pools of assets,
many pension fund managers currently index their funds.1"
Indexing consists of building a portfolio of companies that
together will mirror the performance of the market as a whole,
ensuring that the portfolio will perform no better or worse than
average.1 24 While indexing may be a beneficial long-term invest-
ment strategy, managers of indexed funds have no incentive to
monitor management because they are guaranteed to do no worse
than the market average.125  Indexed investors are interested
only in the performance of the market as a whole and not in the
performance of any one firm in their portfolios.126 Moreover, in
indexed funds, "investment dollars are spread so thinly across a
large number of companies that improving the performance of a
few would hardly influence their overall return. '1 27 Thus, index-
ing promotes passive investment and minimizes managerial
accountability, because managers who know that a large propor-
tion of their investors are indexed recognize that those investors
possess little incentive to monitor their activities.
t8
Additionally, fund managers recognize that consistent opposi-
tion to management proposals will jeopardize their ability to retain
and obtain corporate business. Corporate pension funds typically
divide their assets among several professional money managers and
121. "Pension funds and other institutional investors have neither the staff nor the skills
required to monitor the hundreds, if not thousands, of companies they own." JACOBS,
supra note 17, at 55.
122. Wingerson & Dorn, supra note 108, at 230.
123. Market 2000 Report, supra note 107, at 8. About 33% of all equity holdings owned
by institutional funds are indexed. Coffee, supra note 13, at 1339. Between 1975 and
1992, the percentage of total assets indexed by the top 20 pension funds expanded from
under 1% to 18.3%. Market 2000 Report, supra note 107, at 8.
124. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 54. For a more extensive discussion of indexing and its
benefits, see Wingerson & Dorn, supra note 108, at 227-29.
125. Id at 55.
126. Return of the Absent Owners, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 1994, at 5.
127. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 55.
128. Id at 56.
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are not hesitant to replace those who do not perform as expect-
ed.129 A fund manager who has a reputation for being an active
shareholder is likely to drive potential corporate clients away.
13
1
Thus, money managers are frequently inclined to vote in favor of
management, even if doing so may decrease company value.
131
Internally managed private pension funds are equally reluctant
to oppose corporate managers because they are administered by
executives of the corporations that sponsor them.132 Aware that
they may face retribution in the business community for voting
against their colleagues, corporate executives prefer to trade a non-
performing stock rather than challenge their fellow managers.
133
Moreover, most corporate executives do not want their pensions
to be more active in governance than they want their own
stockholders to be." 4 Thus, when they do decide to vote, most
company pension plans routinely vote in favor of management
proposals, even if the proposals are clearly contrary to investor
interests.
135
Finally, ERISA requirements effectively keep fund managers
from becoming active investors. 36  To ensure that pension
129. Coffee, supra note 26, at 862.
130. Id
131. Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REv. 811, 826 (1992). Professor Coffee writes:
If the fund manager believes that a stock in its portfolio can be increased in value
through proxy voting, there is at least an incentive to undertake such a step in
order to increase portfolio return and avoid replacement in the inevitable
competition among fund managers. But, if such activism will potentially displease
other or future clients, then, unless such activism can be hidden from public view,
there is an offsetting disincentive. Better to lose an existing client, it may feel,
than to acquire an activist reputation that deters dozens of potential clients.
Coffee, supra note 26, at 862.
132. Nell Minow, Viewpoints; Do Your Duty, Retirement Managers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
30, 1994, at C3.
133. Id at C4. This is not true of public pension funds, however. Because they are
administered by elected or appointed officials, public pension funds enjoy a degree of
independence from the business community. Id But see Black, supra note 131, at 827
(noting that public funds are forced to yield to political pressure in deciding whether or
not to oppose management).
134. Roe, supra note 31, at 77.
135. Id Surveys conducted in 1990 indicated that institutions supported management
between 59% and 74% of the time. Coffee, supra note 13, at 1293.
136. Roe, supra note 31, at 95. "ERISA and trustee doctrine help to fragment pension
portfolios, to prevent big blocks, and to keep pension managers out of the boardrooms of
portfolio companies." Id. But see Ethan G. Stone, Comment, Must We Teach Abstinence?
Pensions' Relationship Investments and the Lessons of Fiduciary Duty, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
2222 (1994) (arguing that ERISA's diversification requirements do not prevent fund
American Managerial Myopia
managers do not suffer large losses, ERISA requires them to
diversify their investments, unless it is clearly not prudent to do
so. 137  More importantly, ERISA compels fund managers to
mimic prevailing practices of portfolio management.1 3 8 Because
most institutional investors are passive owners of diversified
investments, a pension fund manager who chooses to purchase
concentrated blocks of stock in order to monitor corporate
management could face liability for doing SO.
13 9
Thus, a multitude of disincentives discourage corporate
pension funds from being active shareholders. The resources
necessary to permit fund managers to perform cost-benefit
analyses for each portfolio firm simply do not exist. And in the
competitive world of fund management, fund managers cannot risk
becoming disfavored by the corporate community. Moreover, fund
managers who are bold enough to ignore these disincentives may
be subject to liability under ERISA for flouting current portfolio
management standards.
B. The Department of Labor Guidelines
Within the past two years, a few corporate pension funds have
nevertheless committed themselves to become active shareholders.
Campbell Soup, for example, recently declared that it would vote
its pension fund shares to promote independent boards of directors
and policies linking executive compensation to performance. 4"°
The majority of private institutional investors, however, refuse to
assume an active monitoring role. 4' Perhaps only pressure from
outside the business community will compel private institutional
investors to shed their passivity and renounce their historical pro-
management bias. With this idea in mind, the DOL recently
promulgated guidelines clarifying that ERISA does not prevent
corporate pension fund managers from actively monitoring their
portfolio companies."
managers from engaging in relationship investing).
137. Roe, supra note 31, at 96.
138. Id at 98-99.
139. Id at 98. Interestingly, given ERISA's imitation standard, a similar regulation in
Germany would require German pension fund managers to purchase concentrated blocks
of stock for control purposes. Id. at 99.
140. Minow, supra note 132, at C3.
141. Franzen, supra note 7, at 295.
142. See generally DOL Guidelines, supra note 16.
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The DOL guidelines generally state that corporate pension
fund managers may engage in activities to influence the manage-
ment of their portfolio companies when such action is likely to
increase the value of shares in their pension funds.143 In particu-
lar, the new regulations require corporate pension fund managers
to vote their shares with a view toward increasing the share value
of the companies in their portfolios.1" Issues that the guidelines
identify as most likely to affect share value, and thus deserving of
fund managers' careful attention, include the following: (1)
independence and expertise of directors, (2) appropriateness of
executive compensation, (3) mergers & acquisitions policy, (4)
extent of debt financing and capitalization, and (5) long-term
business plans.145  The DOL asserts that fund managers, in
addition to exercising voting rights, should correspond and meet
with corporate managers in order to monitor developments
concerning these issues. 46
Perhaps the most important idea expressed in the new guide-
lines is that the voting of proxies is a "fiduciary act of plan
management. ' ' 147  Thus, fund managers, who vote in favor of
management proposals that are likely to decrease share value or
who choose to sell their stock rather than confront management,
theoretically would breach fiduciary duties owed to the pensioners
for whom they manage the funds.
Yet, the DOL guidelines, in their present form, are effectively
unenforceable. They merely suggest that it "may be appropriate"
for a fiduciary to monitor or influence corporate management
when such activities are "likely to enhance the value of the plan's
143. See id at 38,862.
144. Thus, the Guidelines state:
where proxy voting decisions may have an effect on the value of the plan's
underlying investment, plan fiduciaries should make proxy voting decisions with
a view to enhancing the value of the shares of stock, taking into account the
period over which the plan expects to hold such shares. Similarly, in certain
situations it may be appropriate for a fiduciary to engage in activities intended
to monitor or influence corporate management if the fiduciary expects that such
activities are likely to enhance the value of the plan's investment.
Id at 38,862 (emphasis added).
145. Id
146. Id
147. Id. at 38,860. The Guidelines further state that "the fiduciary obligations of
prudence and loyalty to plan participants and beneficiaries require the responsible




investment. ' 148 The guidelines do not contain language explicitly
requiring corporate pension funds to engage in monitoring activity
and they contain no penalties for non-compliance. Moreover,
proving that a fund manager knew in advance whether certain
activities were likely to increase or decrease a company's share
value will be difficult. The DOL guidelines fail to indicate how
fund managers can ascertain when and whether a given activity is
likely to increase share value.
Although no current precedent exists for incorporating into
fund managers' fiduciary duties the obligation to vote the shares
of the companies in their portfolios, doing so may be one way to
enforce the new regulations in order to deter fund managers from
practicing passive investment strategies. Indeed, corporate pension
fund executives may face liability for breaching their fiduciary
responsibilities when they choose to vote non-performing shares
instead of selling them.149 Why, then, should the converse not be
true? Managers of indexed pension funds, who are effectively
unable to exercise their Wall Street option, should face liability for
failing to maximize the long-term value of their portfolio
companies' shares. Similarly, pension executives who vote in favor
of management proposals that are likely to decrease share value
should also face liability. In both scenarios, fund managers who
fail to vote their shares would violate their responsibility to
maximize the value of pensioners' investments, and, thus, should
be liable for their failure to act.
Finally, the guidelines recognize that fund managers may lack
experience in evaluating management and, consequently, are
unable to determine when activism may produce favorable
results. °50 Therefore, they clarify that corporations, which hire
independent professional money managers to administer their
pension funds, may give the fund managers clear directions on how
to vote their proxies.1"' In order to compensate for fund
148. Id. at 38,862 (emphasis added).
149. See, e.g., Anand, supra note 116, at 35.
150. Id.
151. The DOL Guidelines state:
A named fiduciary responsible for appointment of investment managers has the
authority to condition the appointment on acceptance of a statement of
investment policy. Thus, such a named fiduciary may expressly require, as a
condition of the investment management agreement, that an investment manager
comply with the terms of a statement of investment policy which sets forth
guidelines concerning investments and investment courses of action which the
1995]
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managers' inexperience, the guidelines encourage corporate
mangers to substitute their judgment on when and how to vote for
their fund managers' judgment. 52 Thus, the DOL places the
responsibility for deciding when and whether to become active
firmly on the shoulders of corporate management.
The DOL asserts that its new bulletin encourages responsible
shareholder activism and is a step toward a market with a long-
term focus.153 Yet, the guidelines' failure to prescribe a detailed
program of structured interaction between managers and pension
fund executives threatens to contribute to, rather than decrease,
managerial shortsightedness. Simply suggesting that fund manag-
ers and corporate officers correspond and meet with each other is
not sufficient.1" Without regular access to corporate inside
information, fund managers, who must vote with a view to
maximizing share value, will necessarily continue to focus on share
price and quarterly earnings reports. This emphasis on short-term
value maximization will continue to force managers to set aside
long-term plans and focus on short-term growth. The DOL
guidelines, however, are not likely to change investors' behavior in
the near future. At most, they will begin to force corporations and
fund managers to consider activism as a viable investment strategy.
IV. TOWARD THE GERMAN MODEL
Implicit in the DOL guidelines is the idea that reforming legal
rules and business practices, which currently keep institutional
investors passive, could invigorate institutional oversight of
corporate managers.1 5 5  The increasing competitiveness of Ger-
man public firms in the global marketplace, in combination with
the U.S. takeover market's failure to monitor American managers,
suggests that the German system of corporate governance may be
investment manager is authorized or not authorized to make. Such investment
policy may include a policy or guidelines on the voting of proxies on shares of
stock for which the investment manager is responsible.
DOL Guidelines, supra note 16, at 38,864.
152. Id.
153. Labor Department Moves to Increase Shareholder Activism by Pension Plans, 21
BNA PENSION & BENEFITS REP. 1487 (1994).
154. DOL Guidelines, supra note 16, at 38,864. The guidelines state that "active
monitoring and communication may be carried out through a variety of methods including
by means of correspondence and meetings with corporate management as well as by
exercising the legal rights of a shareholder." Id.
155. Black, supra note 131, at 896.
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an appropriate model on which to base the institutional reform
contemplated by the DOL guidelines.
15 6
Indeed, the DOL's call for American corporate pension funds
to become active shareholders is yet another and perhaps the most
compelling indicator that U.S. corporate governance is moving
toward the German model.157 With the increasing institutional
presence in the American market, equity ownership of U.S. public
firms is beginning to approach the concentration of German
shareholdings. 158  Consequently, large institutions are now the
major players in the American stock market, relegating individual
investors to a relatively insignificant role.
Additionally, proposals to reform the U.S. system of corporate
governance increasingly are based on the German system. Among
the most prominent of these is the strong movement afoot to
repeal the Glass-Steagal Act and allow American banks to enter
into the securities business.159 Proponents of this proposal assert
that allowing American banks to own securities and monitor
managers would minimize agency costs in U.S. corporations,
increasing their long-term international competitiveness. 16° This
argument is founded squarely on the belief that bank ownership
and monitoring of corporations in Germany minimizes pressures
on managers to achieve short-term objectives.
1 61
Another school of thought holds that giving shareholders
greater access to American corporate boardrooms will permit
156. Professor Black notes that "the competitive success of Japanese and German firms
adds force to the argument that the U.S. system of strong managers and weak shareholders
can be improved." Id.
157. Mark Roe discusses the proposition that our markets and ownership forms are
moving toward the concentrated structure of Germany. See Roe, supra note 13, at 37.
158. See Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1464. "Voting power is increasingly
concentrated in a small number of major institutions." Id. But see Coffee, supra note 26,
at 852-53 (writing that "although institutional investors may control the majority of
publicly held equity in the United States, share ownership is broadly dispersed amongst
them.")
159. See Steven Lipin & Timothy L. O'Brien, Repeal of Glass Steagal May Hit Wall
With Takeover Wave, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 1995, at Cl. There is evidence that American
commercial banks are already beginning to impinge on investment banks' traditional
dominance over the American securities industry. Since 1989, when the Federal Reserve
first empowered commercial banks to underwrite corporate debt, commercial banks have
captured a significant portion of investment banks' stock and bond underwriting business.
Anita Raghavan, Commercial Banks Emerging as Underwriting Force, WALL ST. J., Apr.
3, 1995, at C1.
160. See generally Franzen, supra note 7.
161. Id. at 299.
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managers to adopt a more long-term orientation. For example,
some have argued that American corporate directors should be
required to hold large equity positions in the companies on whose
boards they serve.1 62 Advocates of this idea contend that giving
directors a personal stake in the companies they oversee will
compel them to shed their traditional pro-management bias.1 63
Perhaps recognizing that this is not likely to occur, however, others
from this school of thought have called on corporations to create
"shareholders' advisory committees."1" Although they would
not provide shareholders with direct boardroom access, such
committees would create a vehicle for shareholders to initiate
regular dialogue with corporate directors. Both suggestions, and
shareholder advisory committees in particular, are specifically
patterned after the German codetermination system.165
Each of these reform proposals seeks to incorporate into
American corporate governance an important element of the
German model that is currently lacking in most American compa-
nies: systematic structured interaction between shareholders and
managers. Allowing shareholders regular access to the inside
information on which corporate management primarily bases its
decisions would permit American managers to focus more on
implementing long term plans and less on meeting short-term
barometers. Further aligning the U.S. system with the German
162. See Lublin & Duff, supra note 11, at B1, B6.
163. Id. at B6.
164. Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 1475-78. Such committees would be
composed of select shareholders designated to engage in periodic discussions with
corporate managers concerning corporate governance issues. Id. at 1475.
For example, in 1992, Exxon shareholders proposed the creation of a committee that
would be responsible for reviewing managerial performance, advising the board of
shareholder views, and including in Exxon's proxy statement a statement regarding its
activities and its evaluation of management. Owners of at least $10 million worth of
Exxon common stock for three years would have been eligible for nomination to the
committee. However, Exxon management ultimately defeated the proposal. Charles F.
Richards, Jr. & Anne C. Foster, Exxon Revisited: The SEC Allows Pennzoil to Exclude
Both Mandatory and Precatory Proposals Seeking to Create a Shareholder Advisory
Committee, 43 BUS. LAW. 1509, 1510 (1993).
165. Jayne Barnard, Institutional Investors and the New Corporate Governance, 68 N.C.
L. REv. 1135, 1146-48 (1991). "An essential model for the shareholders' advisory
committee is the German ... public company which is governed not by a unitary board
of directors, as in the United States, but by two separate and distinct bodies." Id. at 1147.
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model, however, is not the proper avenue to facilitate such
information sharing. 16"
Significant cultural and political differences between Germany
and the United States impact the feasibility of implementing a
German-style system of corporate governance in the United
States.167 In order to maintain political and economic indepen-
dence from the global economy in the aftermath of World War II,
Germany sought to center its economy around a strong central
banking system. 16 Germany was more interested in protecting
an entire country than in protecting the rights of individual
shareholders. 69 Thus, today financial institutions are significant-
ly more important than capital markets to the German econo-
my.170 In contrast, the capital contributions of widely dispersed
individual shareholders were absolutely integral to support the
rapid expansion of the U.S. economy following the war.
171
Regulatory barriers effectively prevented American financial
institutions from funding American economic expansion.1 7
Strong capital markets thus evolved into the primary source of
funding for American industrial growth, buoyed, in significant part,
by the support of individual shareholders.
To proceed further in the direction of the German system of
corporate governance, and rely on banks or large institutions to
reign in managers, would jeopardize the strength of American
capital markets. As the German system illustrates, institutional
ownership breeds concentration and concentration compromises
stock market liquidity.173 Decreasing American capital markets'
liquidity would impair American companies' ability to raise capital
by selling equity to the public. Moreover, increasing institutional
control over American public companies would further disenfran-
166. Louis Lowenstein notes: "It would be foolish for the U.S. to emulate in some
mechanical fashion the German merchant banks ... through which industrial managers
consult with their shareholders and lenders on an informal but continuing basis." Louis
Lowenstein & Ira M. Millstein, The American Corporation and the Institutional Investor:
Are There Lessons from Abroad?, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 739, 745 (1988).
167. Franzen, supra note 7, at 303.
168. Id. at 287.
169. Id.
170. Roe, supra note 13, at 23.
171. Roe, supra note 31, at 79.
172. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
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chise the individual investors on which the United States relied to
become the most competitive nation in the global marketplace.174
Finally, American institutions are not as qualified as German
supervisory board members to monitor American managers.
German bankers are trained to be both massive owners of equity
and expert monitors, while pension funds and other American
institutions lack comparably skilled employees. 175  The Glass-
Steagal Act has effectively prevented American bankers from
investing in American public companies and, thus, from monitoring
corporate managers. American fund managers are trained solely
to earn money for their clients; they are not equipped to serve as
board members of companies. In contrast, because most current
outside directors have been or are chief executives of other public
companies, they have experience in managing large corporations.
Therefore, proceeding further toward the German model would
simply permit unskilled fund managers and bankers to replace
directors who are infinitely more experienced than they are in
making business decisions.
V. CONCLUSION
Bridging the communication gap in American corporations
between owners and managers will provide managers with
additional freedom to pursue long-term growth policies.
The German dual-board system, in fact, permits managers and
shareholders to communicate regularly. However, the German
system effectively unifies ownership and control,176 preventing
ownership from being regularly traded. The liquidity of American
capital markets is integral to the success of U.S. corporations.
Therefore, the German system is an inadequate model for
American corporate reform.
The DOL Guidelines are equally problematic. Following their
prescriptions would increase pressures on corporate managers to
meet short-term objectives. Institutions currently decide how to
vote by studying exclusively short-term indicators. They must have
access to corporate inside information in order to make truly
informed voting decisions.
174. See Franzen, supra note 7, at 303.
175. Id
176. Professsors Gilson and Kraakman note that the German model "unifies rather
than bridges ownership and control." Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 12, at 878.
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The American system of corporate governance must develop
a forum in which managers can provide shareholders with regular
access to corporate inside information. Regular dialogue between
corporate managers and owners bridges ownership and control
without compromising stock market liquidity. Most importantly,
improving dialogue between shareholders and managers will
permit American corporate managers to pursue long-term
strategies, thus improving the long-term global competitivemness
of the American economy.
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